Editing Term:Multiplicity (section)

=== Sense "plurality" vs sense "spacetime" ===

Between Bergson and Deleuze, there is a subtle problem that forms between attempting to characterize events as <i>multiplicities</i> of objects versus as <i>multiplicities</i> of connected instants of time. These are very different concepts that both end up using the same word simply because there are several (<i>multiple</i>) of each thing. Somehow, neither author appears to think of the concept of [[Term:relativity|relativity]] and realize that it is also possible for every separate object in the multiplicity of objects to undergo a multiplicity of times. This is a critical realization because it means that Bergon's multiplicity of times may be an illusion — should there be two people Henry and Felix each experiencing a multiplicity of times, they would not be experiencing any of the <em>same</em> times, but rather one would be experiencing Henry-seconds and one would be experiencing Felix-seconds, and the Henry-seconds would only become Felix-seconds or vice versa inasmuch as the two people are or are not able to interact with each other. This should cast immediate doubt on any and all [[E:Q42|existentialist]] attempts to transform time into something that can only be "experienced", given that in most situations Henry fundamentally cannot even know what a Felix-second <em>is</em> nor Felix know what a Henry-second is. Their individual experiences are inaccessible to each other, so it cannot be said Bergson-style that Henry-seconds are <em>more intuitive</em> to Felix than an objective lens describing relativity as it occurs for all perspectives when Felix will never intuitively know what a Henry-second is in the first place.