Philosophical Research:Schizophrenic point of view

For the purposes of analyzing philosophies, signifiers may take the form of jargon terms, ordinary words employed in recognizable but highly-specific usages, repeated quotes from older texts, repeated in-text citations or prior work titles, or images with controversial meanings across different philosophies. For instance, "Stalin's government" could be considered a signifier because within the broad field of Marxist discourse Trotskyists and Stalin followers interpret the significance of the image differently and attach different underlying models of real-world function to it. If it happens that these models are so drastically different they hardly even resemble each other, the Signifier-item is best divided into two separate Signifiers, such as "Stalin's government (Trotskyism)" and "Stalin's government (Stalin Thought)". Using this method of combining relatively-ordinary or widespread usages and disambiguating tags, controversies can be exposed which are normally invisible within the bounds of particular philosophies. It can be argued that projects such as Wikipedia suffer from the inability to package themselves in localized, biased language familiar to real-world readers, who may look at the neutral framings of Wikipedia, regard them as foreign to their particular philosophy and experience, and reject the whole project as "biased" or "improperly infiltrated by mainstream thought". However, if a project instead decides to forego pretending that neutrality through a single point of view is possible and simply express itself in several different biased framings at once, it becomes easier to illuminate the differences between various different biased ideologies and the relationship of each ideology to material reality and what is most likely to be true.

-

Due to the structure of this wiki, in which the internal reasoning or mechanics of various ideologies are represented in parallel before then covering how different ideologies support or debunk each other, this motif can easily end up serving as a bridge to any number of "offensive" results. Combinations in general are expected to be interpreted relative to the vantage point of the two things being combined, such that "Trotsky" plus "democracy" is expected to yield some result which would make sense from the populational vantage point of a group of Trotskyists, rather than the point of view of the overall Soviet Union or of any overseas country. However, at the same time, it is acceptable to code results which represent the action or path a particular group of people would realistically take and would be obligated to acknowledge as having been their choice if they were intellectually honest and wished to correctly understand history, as long as their vantage point is preserved. This means that in some cases it is acceptable to code routes which combine reactionary concepts to create reactionary propositions or strategies, if they serve an educational purpose of identifying and dissecting reactionary thinking or behavior. "Modest" proposals, while they can be used to criticize other ideologies, run into problems on a meta-ontological level in that when the concept pops up in any other socially-linked group of people with another ideology the standards which set them apart as obviously fake are no longer present and the element of irony is quickly lost; inside a group of Tories, the line between "modest proposal" and "dogwhistle for secretly announcing similar real-world plan" becomes increasingly fine, or nonexistent. This should be considered a problem with the motif itself, rather than SPoV or meta-ontological soundness.

---

This should, and, will be a new page shortly...

• https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Neutral_point_of_view
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Neutral_point_of_view
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conservapedia

---

(draft)

Perhaps you have heard of particular projects having "Neutral point of view"

there is just one problem: most people have an internal monologue and internal series of associations particular to them, and don't carry multiple plural voices inside their heads

this leads ordinary people to all sorts of bias and prejudice against any philosophy or model they do not already explicitly believe

that's a problem for an encyclopedia: to be objective or neutral we must first be able to think and evaluate different hypotheses. but fundamentally, a great portion of people are not allowed to think. their ties to other people or specific organizations that sustain their lives prevent them from considering other philosophies.

morality cannot solve this - Vegeta effect

Conservapedia

It is easy to argue that in a world made of plural populations all practicing different internal philosophies neutrality is a material impossibility

How can the world prevent Conservapedias? Why, by following Schizophrenic point of view!

can Communism and nationalism live in harmony? well, they can on an encyclopedia page, if not necessarily anywhere else. so too is the case with mainstream Marxism-Leninism and Trotskyism, Marxism and the Existentialist-Structuralist tradition of analytic philosophy, and so on.

is this a postmodern nightmare? you bet it is. but the world did it first, and an encyclopedia must document the world.

This article may sound funny but it's genuinely not meant as satire

Lexemes

The ideal Lexeme item is created specifically because a term has at least two different opposing definitions. For example: language. In everyday usage, language can be defined as a prescriptive system belonging to a particular group of people, or a descriptive system belonging to multiple groups of people, leading to contradictory assertions that terms like ain't or facticity are "not words" within the English language and "not part of language" versus other assertions that because someone uses them they are "inherently part of language". To begin resolving this contradiction, we create a Lexeme item for "language" containing both of these definitions and tagging them with their appropriate ideology or philosophy.

100. language
     1. a method of communication based around associations between signs and concepts or between signs and other signs
     2. (structuralist linguistics) a descriptive system of rules by which further consistent rules for communication are constructed: see descriptive linguistics
     3. (Toryism) a prescriptive system of rules for communication tightly associated with a particular unique nationality or social graph: see linguistic prescriptivism

This helps resolve conflicts that may occur when editing more complex ontologies in the main Item namespace: "I mean language as in prescriptivism!" Should a new user come along who for some reason is not content with the primary model of a given concept and wishes to edit a different model of it, this user can then point the alternate model of "language" to Lexeme Sense L100-S3. As much as this capability may seem alarming to the uninitiated, appearing to open all the proverbial floodgates for the legitimacy of all reactionary ideologies and strip words of their meaning, it has many valid uses by members of progressive ideologies such as disambiguating reactionary meanings from intended meanings and studying the history or formation of reactionary meanings and models. With other tools such as the F2 Statement category, particular models may be marked as incorrect or outdated in relation to real-world observations, and Lexemes become convenient disambiguation landings for separating fact from conspiracy theory.

Items

S2 Signifier Items

S2 Signifier Items should be considered to frequently represent statements of opinion specific to a particular group of people; in one sense, their purpose is orthogonal to the concept of neutrality.

it is okay to name S2 Signifiers in a slanted way appropriate to the ontological perspective of the group of people who would state it as long as the bias is not a rhetorical statement prohibiting the existence of other S2 Signifiers on the same topic. if a particular S2 Signifier legitimately has two possible meanings to different ideologies or theoretical models in the manner of a Lexeme, then its current name should be demoted to an alias and it should be renamed to something more dry and objective.

When are statements false?

it has been argued that "truth" is not a good framework for understanding reality. sometimes the term truth gets applied in totally subjective contexts such as what belongs to the definition of a field of mathematics and what doesn't. some things like quantum-scale objects or black holes simply cannot be objectively observed, for instance because the experimental subject has become too small to observe with anything big and solid enough to have been manipulated into an experimental instrument, or the experimental subject is somehow smaller than time such that any attempt to move objects behaving in time near it looks distorted (to say nothing of the much worse possibility of a tearing-apart of time tearing apart the apparatus with it). this isn't to say such vanishingly small phenomena never will be understood — only that for the past few decades most scientists have been forced to study only the changes that appear on the outermost boundaries of the phenomenon rather than what might be inside. this has led science to define reality based on characterizing the behaviors of everything that can reasonably be observed, whether immediately or in the near future when a plausible new experimental apparatus is actually developed. although the total of what humanity can observe may change over time, science must ground its models and calculations in predicting what we can currently observe.

science focuses on the accuracy of proposed models to real-world behavior. formal logic does not necessarily begin in this kind of foundation, because one of the first rules of formal logic is that statements must be valid or invalid to the system of reasoning before they are required to be true to the material world. formal logic is designed to encourage evaluating statements as single integer numbers or binary bits, although the actual act of comparing any statement to the real world will be far more complicated than 1 or 0. this is to say that a propositional logic appropriate for science needs to operate on rules other than booleans and bit operations to determine whether statements are true.

for the purposes of distinguishing S2 Statements from F2 Statements, an F2 Statement is an inaccurate statement which is not useful to operating in the real world and an S2 Statement is a statement which has not been identified as inaccurate; an S2 Statement is any hypothesis on a topic which may either be accurate or inaccurate, and an F2 Statement is a hypothesis which has been rejected. a Z2 Statement is not strictly guaranteed to be accurate to any particular system defined as reality, but contains a fully explained mathematical description of some particular physical behavior based on everything that can be accurately observed about that defined reality.

Statements must be meta-ontologically sound as written to avoid being marked inaccurate. Due to the limits of HTML presentation, this may mean the whole statement is only found in an Item's aliases or its usage notes rather than its outward label; this is fine. However, if a statement is made about the whole world when it only applies in the United States, it will be marked inaccurate unless it is changed or forked into a statement specifically about the United States; the same could happen with populations or demographic identities of any scale.

There may be multiple valid strategies to avoid statements which are intended to be neutral observations being marked inaccurate. One relatively easy way is to make the statement very specific so that it does not cover cases where it would not apply — "For United States White people...". Another more difficult way is to make the statement more literal, making use of the principles of existential materialism to describe a phenomenon on the correct physical scale and level of generality so that it will actually be true everywhere — "The relationship between subpopulations of greater populations and individuals...". Yet another way is to turn a questionable statement into a statement about a speaker or text: "Trotsky believed that all the world's populations would spontaneously become a single government", instead of "All the world's populations will spontaneously become a single government".

SPoV and demographic prejudice

Don't use Lexemes to codify slurs

In most cases, Lexeme entries should encompass nearly every possible connotation of a term used by more than a couple people, or simply used extensively and seriously enough to a point that someone will have historically documented them. One of the very few exceptions for when the arbitrary connotations of a term should not be codified onto Lexemes is when the Lexeme primarily refers to a unique real-world entity which is considered a demographic identity, or in other words, a characteristic of individual human beings that sorts them into physically-unique populations. The notion of demographic identities may be defined by different people in different contexts to include or exclude various kinds of "groups of people", but here it is used in the broadest sense of the term that almost solely excludes unique populations which strictly exist as non-unique realization processes. Thus, "French", "Buddhist", "Arab", "transgender", "autistic", "bisexual", "Inuit", "pre-Columbian", "deaf", "Third-World", "middle-aged", "Soviet", "United-States", and "atheist" or "nonbeliever" are demographic identities, but "Tory", "rationalist", and "string theorist" are not. Some populations may sit in the gray area between being demographic identities and not, such as "Trotskyist" and "anarchist" — on the surface these are political ideologies defined by non-unique realization processes, yet in the process of realization, they invariably attempt to create physically-unique populations that as physical civilizations existing at particular times may be considered demographic identities in some contexts. The status of how these unique philosophical populations will vary at different times; at some times there may be a legitimate concern about not putting insulting definitions on variations of "Trotskyist" or "anarchist", while at other times it may be acceptable to add definitions that tear apart the concepts or models of these ideologies as ideologies.

One edge case where the activity of documenting the association of written signs to stereotypes may be perfectly allowed is in the case of slurs themselves. If, for instance, there is a Lexeme "bitch", and it usually refers to a mostly benign concept used in animal breeding, but there is another sense in which somebody has assigned the term to an objectionable stereotype, it is acceptable to add this Sense to "bitch", especially along with an illustrative source citation, in the interest of documenting and exposing hateful language usage. The difference here is that (despite what anybody may think) "bitch" is not itself a demographic, so adding potentially offensive Senses to it is not a problem.

On the other side of this, if something is the name of a unique population, that population does not necessarily always have the inherent right to declare an association which is not made with the intent to insult or offend to be a problem. If a Trotskyist tries to tell you that information about Trotskyism can only be put on "Leninism", this should not immediately be taken as a valid argument given that Trotskyist is not inherently an insult, any more than "Communist" or "Stalin-follower" is an insult. Likewise, if Martin Heidegger were to tell you he should not be grouped under the definition of the early-existentialist tradition, he would not necessarily be correct about the category of his own work purely because he said it.

People-groups and racism

it's quite easy for any ontology project, from analytic philosophy to machine learning to this, to bake in biases against particular demographic identities

• anti-essentialism
  • watch out for stereotypes and quarantine them into S2 statements
• mark potentially offensive statements with their ideology: (Toryism) etc
• mark any statements known to be factually/testably incorrect as f2
• give references for why statements are f2
  • the more people gripe about an f2 status, the more references go on the f2 statement
  • seek out widely-available print sources - literally find one at your town library
    • wikipedia absolutely doesn't do this enough
  • seek out local community centers and their materials
    • outright seek out church brochures

On morality

this is a resource which presents itself in almost strictly descriptive terms

it is strongly recommended that you do not phrase policy guides or other such sets of instructions in terms of morality or ethics. in various places across the world, it has increasingly become the case that if any guideline is phrased in terms of morality or ethics a great number of people will simply decide not to take it seriously. you can read the MDem chapter "The Saiyan Revolution" for more context on this phenomenon [currently unfinished]. because we cannot control people's minds and spontaneously use our will to cause them to transform into what we think is the correct method of thinking, we must make do with the methods we actually have of getting people to behave. if people claim to believe in morality but in actuality they have no idea what morality is and seem to reject that it is necessary, then phrasing guides in terms of "it's basic decency" or "it's what an empathetic person would do" will have no effect on these people, and we must simply explain the reasons for policies in terms of structures, processes, State mechanisms, and consequences. it is unfortunate the world has come to this, but at the scale of individuals or small associations of people, there is not much anyone can do in daily life to change it. a mere localized project of people individually editing dictionary and ontology entries does not realistically have the power to mandate particular ways for people to think, believe, and interpret the world, so in consequence it must be that the policies of this project merely function as a form of outer structure that holds the project together and keeps it standing. the action of following project policies is merely something editors perform; it should not be presented as something editors believe in their hearts. we can never necessarily know what is in editors' hearts, but we can know that any particular combination of pieces can be described by an ontology of how it operates, to be followed as a set of instructions in order to assemble that particular puzzle. follow the rules if you want to see the furniture kit put together, and when getting others to follow the rules, remember that you are not reading people a set of holy tablets, but merely describing the instructions to the furniture kit.