Ontology:Q50,74

5074. [S2] (pronounced [S2]) Twenty-sided dice have free will 1:(-)1:(-)1

Core characteristics

item type

S2 (C (pronounced C)) 1:(-)1:(-)1

[P] (pronounced [P]) label [string] (L)

[S2] (pronounced [S2]) Twenty-sided dice have free will 1:(-)1:(-)1

[P] (pronounced [P]) alias (en) [string]

A twenty-sided die has free will

Dice have free will

Coins have free will

QID references [Item] 1:(-)1:(-)1

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sub-case of [Item]

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case of [Item]

existential-materialist thought experiment 1:(-)1:(-)1

jamming proposition 1:(-)1:(-)1

super-case of [Item]

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major theme

S–617 (pronounced S–617) [S] (pronounced [S]) Free Will (C (pronounced C)) 1:(-)1:(-)1

Components

model combines claims

[S2] At least one entity on earth has Free Will (proposed; ES) 1:(-)1:(-)1

model combines claims

[S2] Free Will is the ability to do otherwise

model combines claims

[S2] Free Will is the ability to make decisions

model combines claims

[S2] Free Will is the ability to select the future

Use in thesis portals

appears in work [Item]

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Wavebuilder combinations

[P] (pronounced [P]) Wavebuilder (pronounced Wavebuilder): forms result [Item]

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along with [Item]

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forming from [Item]

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Wavebuilder characterizations

Wavebuilder (pronounced Wavebuilder): route [Item]

[S2] (pronounced [S2]) Twenty-sided dice have free will 1:(-)1:(-)1

along with [Item]

[S2] Free Will is the ability to make decisions

forming from [Item]

[S2] Free Will is the ability to make decisions

Z–617 (pronounced Z–617) [Z] (pronounced [Z]) twenty-sided die (tabletop games) 1:(-)1:(-)1

[S2] (pronounced [S2]) Twenty-sided dice have free will 1:(-)1:(-)1

Usage notes

This is the claim that twenty-sided dice have the hypothetical process called "free will" in the same sense as humans are said to have it. For the purposes of this claim, a die is any physical geometric solid which can be rolled, with any number of sides; it is a physical object, it can be tossed to land on a distinct result that it lands on independently of the user's ability to easily predict it, and it functions as a crude example of a true random number generator at least under certain conditions. Multiple other kinds of physical randomizers may count under this definition, including coins.

Typically, Existentialism-based philosophies will assume this claim is false. One possible reasoning for this is that free will cannot possibly be possessed by inanimate objects because inanimate objects are designed and created but they do not have the physical capacity to create anything; if everything about an object is chosen by something else, it cannot have free will. However, while this reasoning would be fine in relation to a static object like a ceramic mug or an umbrella, it is dubious in relation to a twenty-sided die. Given a long enough book full of data tables, a twenty-sided die can create and design any number of combinations of things even though it lacks a proper mind — this is the heart of many tabletop role-playing games. Every time a die is rolled it has the capacity to make a decision between twenty possible things. The die makes its decisions with roughly equal probability, beginning with no inherent bias toward any particular alternative, yet at the same time it can certainly pick one thing out of several things. Is this to say that the die has the ability to choose and the ability to do otherwise? It is certainly true in a technical sense that when a die lands on 5, it could have landed on 10 or 20 instead. How do we know a die is not specifically making one choice rather than another choice?

If the random, equal-probability nature of the die disqualifies it from having made a choice, then it is worth asking if a non-random probability actually makes things better or worse. If Alice is a human being, and she has a 70% chance to choose one particular thing instead of another, is she more or less free to choose any outcome than the die is? If Alice always chooses the same outcome 7 out of 10 times, it would almost begin to look from the outside like the die's decision is free but Alice's decision is predetermined. If Libertarian Free Will is the ability to take any action, then the die is one of the most free entities there is and it would appear that any human being has far less ability to choose differently and do otherwise than a twenty-sided die. But it is not typical that most people who believe in the existence of free will will say a die has free will while a human being does not.

This gives us an insight into the nature of what free will must and must not be if it were the case that human beings had it.

• It cannot be that free will is the ability to do otherwise, because a die can do otherwise without having any capacity to think proactively or think independently of the person rolling it; whenever a die lands on one side instead of another it has done otherwise.
• It cannot be that free will is the ability to select one future instead of another future, because a die can select one of two futures without the capacity to think proactively; open your tabletop book to a data table and roll the die, and it chooses one of two futures for the fictional tabletop game narrative.
• It cannot be that free will is the lack of an ability to be predicted, because a die cannot think proactively and yet as long as it cannot be seen it cannot be predicted.
• It cannot be that free will is the statement that the future is "not fixed", because there are a finite number of outcomes associated with the die, and even given an edge case like the die falling off the table, there are still a finite number of these edge cases which are meaningfully different from the normal outcomes or each other; if there are not exactly 20 outcomes, there may still be exactly 100 outcomes and no more. This does not even change if a human being is acting to change the outcomes, given that locked in the same room with minimal outside contact, that human being will eventually run out of ideas. The number of outcomes is always limited by the set of things interacting and the physics or characteristics of those things.
• It cannot be that free will depends on a religious model of a dualistic soul if it is the case that free will applies to things which are not designed. If it is the case that human beings are designed in the image of their creator, then it is the case that there is no difference between human beings and dice. If it is the case that human beings are not designed by anything except evolution, it is possible to draw a distinction between human beings and dice but it is not possible to draw a distinction between dice and souls. If human beings are undesigned products of their environment then souls are undesigned products of their environment. In order to argue that the difference between human beings and dice is souls you must provide a naturalistic model of the soul.
• Any claim about free will must explain how a human is different from a twenty-sided die, or a hypothetical die with a thousand sides that still behaves like a die.
• Any claim about free will must explain how making a choice is different from randomly landing on one of twenty outcomes.
• Any claim about free will must explain how aiming for a particular future is different from randomly landing on an outcome that then has particular consequences.
• Any claim about free will must explain why pre-designed objects cannot make choices and why making a choice requires not being a pre-designed object — or alternatively, how it is that pre-designed objects make choices which are not the choices of the designer.
• Any claim about free will must explain why the inability to see an outcome coming does or does not have anything to do with independent choices and the internal process of making choices.
• Any claim about free will must explain how free will is different from freedom or whether they are the same.